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 Perspective is part of the historian’s craft--an interpretive point-of-view that serves as an 
organizing lens through which facts and events are given some order and sense.  There is no 
history without selection and the author’s own analysis, his or her own construction of an 
argument.  But among the conventions with which a historical narrative is fashioned, there must 
be faithfulness to established facts, care in the discussion of existing historiography, and some 
restraint in allowing one’s own biases and preferences to influence the story.  In his avowed 
postrevisionist history of the Russian Revolution of 1917, Sean McMeekin thwarts many of 
these conventions. 
 McMeekin’s area of expertise has been late Ottoman history with forays into World War 
I and the Russian role in its origins.  In this breezy history he takes on the academic 
professionals who have written on 1917 with the aim to right the record, which he argues has 
been distorted by most practitioners, with notable exceptions like Harvard emeritus historian 
Richard Pipes.  Like Pipes, whom he admires and cites hundreds of times, McMeekin sets out to 
reverse the social historical consensus of a generation of self-styled “revisionists,” who had 
refocused the history of the Revolution from a tale of demonic conspirators like Vladimir Lenin 
to a broader panorama of social actors--women, workers, soldiers, and peasants--who through 
their own activities undermined the moderate Provisional Government, self-selected in February, 
and opened the way for the Bolshevik seizure of power in October.  In his narrative, McMeekin 
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begins with the intriguer Rasputin, who, it turns out, was wise enough to warn the hapless 
Nicholas II not to enter the Great War, and continues with Mikhail Rodzianko and Alexander 
Guchkov, who conspired with the military to drive the emperor to abdicate. McMeekin’s point-
of-view is legitimist, defending the legally constituted authority against treacherous usurpers 
from below or outside who undermined the organs of order, most particularly the army. He 
characterizes the February Revolution as a mutiny since legitimate authority belonged to the tsar, 
and the people in the streets were notoriously bloody-minded.   
 Unfortunately, this text is quite unreliable.  There are factual errors--the Russian Social 
Democrats did not split into Bolsheviks and Mensheviks because of Lenin’s anti-Semitism; 
neither the April Crisis nor the “July Days” were attempts at a Bolshevik putsch (the selection of 
this redolent word is not accidental)--and unexplained omissions, primarily the whole social 
landscape in which Bolshevism grew into the most potent political force in Petrograd and other 
major cities.  Like earlier conservative accounts of the Bolshevik victory, McMeekin subscribes 
to discredited theses that Lenin and his party were not only bought by German gold but were the 
principal reason (by their effective propagandizing) why workers and soldiers turned into 
irresponsible, even treasonous, subversives.  There is no discussion of the economic collapse of 
the country, the social polarization of upper and lower classes that led to a protocivil war 
between the soviets and the government, or the independent aspirations of the lower classes that 
Lenin and his comrades articulated in their demands for land, peace, and a government of 
soviets.  McMeekin’s concentration on the military yields interesting insights, because, as Lenin 
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understood, revolution is not an election campaign but a war.  The winner is the side that has 
men with guns at the right place at the right time.   
But because the social, economic, and even discursive contexts are left out, in order to 
explain major turning points, the author repeatedly relies on accidents and coincidences: if only 
the tsarevitch’s measles had broken out a day earlier, the tsar would not have left Petrograd for 
the front; what if Lenin had been arrested on the eve of October?  He sets up Marxism as a straw 
man and ends up with bewildering contingencies:  “Far from an eschatological ‘class struggle’ 
borne along inexorably by the Marxist dialectic, the events of 1917 were filled with might-have-
beens and missed chances” (345).  Ignoring what dozens of historians have contributed to our 
knowledge of 1917 does not advance understanding of extraordinary events that profoundly 
shaped the past one hundred years. 
University of Michigan  Ronald Grigor Suny 
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